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For several years now, accumulation of
genetic information has accelerated at a
pace that exceeds the acceleration of com-
puter capacity (Moore’s law) and there is
no discernible limit to prospects of further
growth. As the cost per unit of obtained
genetic information is plummeting
(Niedringhaus et al., 2011), genetics has
become a frontrunner and a catalyst of
the informatics revolution that is affecting
very diverse biomedical scientific fields. In
non-biomedical science, somewhat equiv-
alent roles to genetics have been assumed
by other disciplines that are also driven by
big data, e.g., observational astrophysics
and high-energy and particle physics.
This evolving big data paradigm offers
the opportunity to re-think about pri-
orities surrounding different steps in the
scientific process.
Making new discoveries has been
deemed traditionally the most impor-
tant aspect of scientific investigation. By
“traditionally,” I mean the usual crite-
ria of funding agencies, the publication
priorities of major scientific journals,
the selection processes for prestigious
academic recognitions, even the public
imagination and fantasizing on what sci-
entific investigation is all about. According
to the most widespread cliché, scientists
discover new things by collecting and ana-
lyzing more and more data. However,
the genomic information explosion has
caused an oversupply crisis. This crisis has
drastically devalued the currency of dis-
covery. Data are overabundant; most of it
can be accumulated without any serious
thinking; actually researchers with per-
sonal mental labor are not even needed
to collect data: commercial chips do the
trick, and robots do the pipetting. Not
only data are abundant, discoveries are
also as abundant. Even if we postulate an
1:1,000,000 ratio of claimed discoveries to
data items, there are zillions of discoveries
that can now be claimed every day. Based
on what we have started to surmise empir-
ically,most of these claimed discoveries are
likely to be either totally false preliminary
observations (Ioannidis, 2005) or sub-
stantially exaggerated results (Ioannidis,
2008), a consequence of the extreme mul-
tiplicity of the probed data-space, the
winner’s curse (Zollner and Pritchard,
2007), and other biases. “Negative” results
have almost disappeared from many sci-
entific fields, especially those with “softer”
measurements and more flexible analyti-
cal tools (Fanelli, 2010). Results procured
by the most popular research sub-fields
seem to have the lowest reliability (Pfeiffer
and Hoffman, 2009). It seems likely that
there is an extraordinary large number
of small, weak effects and links (“risks”
in epidemiological language), barely dis-
cernible from measurement error and
diverse potential biases. Single discover-
ies made in single databases are likely to
mean very little, they are mostly a nui-
sance that propagates confusion in the
literature. Exceptions certainly occur, and
some strong/large effects may still exist,
awaiting discovery. Even then, it is unlikely
that the discoverer who hits upon them
will have any more merit than the thou-
sands of other researchers who only come
across the flooding multitude of weak
or false effects. The process of reward-
ing discoverers claiming large effects (be
that with grants, tenure, or Nobel prizes)
may eventually become indistinguishable
from running a lottery. If we add human
nature, biases, and conflicts (Ioannidis,
2011), a lottery system may be even
preferable.
In settings where claimed discoveries
become more than we can absorb and
tolerate and when most claims about
discoveries are false, replication becomes
the most important, central piece of sci-
ence. Replication efforts typically require
a shift toward team science (e.g., con-
sortia; Austin et al., 2012). They place
emphasis on a community effort to find
the few true among many wrong pro-
posed leads. Replication offers a realis-
tic chance of maintaining the scientific
literature reasonably noise-free. Genetics
has shown clearly how important this is.
Human genome epidemiology was radi-
cally transformed in the last decade by
the adoption of a rigorous replication cul-
ture. While the vast majority of claims
for genetic associations based on biological
plausibility speculations and performed
by single teams without replication were
apparently wrong (Ioannidis, 2011), large
meta-analyses of genome-wide associa-
tion studies using agnostic platforms and
sine-qua-non, rigorous replication across
multiple teams and multiple datasets has
yielded thousands of associations with
unquestionably high credibility (Hindorff
et al., 2009). How many other scientific
fields are still conducting studies based
on biological plausibility speculations and
performed by single teams without repli-
cation? Probably most of the literature
in diverse fields has been based on these
same premises and will likely collapse
once rigorous replication practices are
adopted.
As replication creates an expanding,
more reliable basis of knowledge, the need
to further translate and implement this
knowledge becomes also essential. Until
now, research emphasis (and funding) has
been placed disproportionately on T0 (dis-
covery research) and some T1 (research
for development of new tests or therapies)
(Schully et al., 2011), with exponentially
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diminishing investments as we move to
later stages of translation. I have great
sympathy for the concept of science for
the sake of science. Perhaps much scien-
tific knowledge has absolutely no practical
use and no further translational potential.
This would not diminish its importance.
For genetics in particular, the satisfaction
of intellectual curiosity for the labyrinth
of genetic architecture is a legitimate goal.
However, many opinion leaders argue (to
colleagues, politicians, and taxpayers) that
emphasis on genetics (or other) research is
justified because of the practical potential
that this knowledge may have for improv-
ing health outcomes in single individu-
als and larger populations (Feero et al.,
2010). This promise is in stark disagree-
ment with the scant resources that are
currently applied to later stages of trans-
lational research and, in particular, on
the potential implementation of the accu-
mulating research findings. Accomplishing
these translational stages will require rig-
orous methods, including well-performed
clinical trials. The expectation that real
progress will happen and genetics will
change our everyday life for the better in
a vacuum of rigorous implementation evi-
dence is not realistic. Genetics can revolu-
tionize medicine and drastically improve
outcomes, or may lead to the adoption
of millions of genetics-based tests and
interventions that are false, useless, costly,
or all of that. We have had so many
brilliant, spectacular, innovative discover-
ies so far—more of the same brilliant,
spectacular innovation alone is becoming
terribly boring; it is rigorous replication
that guarantees science and it is success-
ful translation and implementation that
matters.
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